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under the unfortunate title of ‘‘discounting.’’ The discount rate
can best be thought of as an interest rate applied to reductions
rather than increases. Interest rates have to do with return on
money. A 5% interest rate means your £100 in a bank is worth
£105 in a year’s time. In reverse, a £105 to be paid in a year has a
present value of £100. The £105 is discounted by 5%.
The issue is how interest rates might apply to things other
than money. This matters in cost-benefit analysis, particularly
with long time scales. Applying a 5% discount rate to benefits
means that any benefit 15 years away is halved. £100 in 50 years
would be valued at £8 now.
The decision by the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) to change its discount rate for health benefits is
subjected to forensic criticism by O’Mahoney and Paulden in this
edition [1]. What appears to have happened is that NICE, faced
with recommending against mifamurtide, a drug for a rare
disease (osteosarcoma) in children, because of its high cost/
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), decided to reduce the cost per
QALY by applying a lower discount rate to health benefits.
Specifically that health benefits after 30 years should be valued
at 1.5% provided the benefit was curative and substantial. NICE’s
action, it is suggested, was based partly on the views of its
Citizen’s Council, which having considered a hypothetical case
very similar to mifamurtide recommended in favor of the drug.
O’Mahony and Paulden [1] find the criteria for differential
discounting ambiguous in that the rationale for the health gains
being ‘‘sustained’’ and ‘‘substantial in restoring health’’ are
lacking. They suggest that these criteria will lead to inconsisten-
cies due to the arbitrariness of distinguishing between technol-
ogies on these criteria.
More telling they suggest that NICE ignored developments that
might have offered an alternative means to the same solution,
that is, recommending mifamurtide. These arguments [2,3], which
are only briefly summarized in the article, are worth considering.
First, assume a fixed budget for a health care system whose
objective is health maximization in the form of QALYs. Then, the
standard maximization rule is to fund each technology (or
service) up to the point where its incremental cost per QALY is
equal to that for all other technologies. This works on the basis
that if some technology has a lower (better) ICER, then more
QALYs can be produced by spending more on it, up to the point
that its ICER equals all others. And vice versa.
The significance of this assumption is worth pondering. Is the
National Health Service (NHS) budget fixed? And if so, is it right?
The Department of Health (or NHS) is seen as ‘‘a socially
legitimate higher authority which is unable to express an explicit
and coherent social welfare function’’ [3]. This means that the
NHS budget is set by democratically elected government actingial support: The author has no other financial relthrough public expenditure reviews and the like. It matters not
that the level or pattern of spend is right or that it changes over
time. It is a given. So far so good.
And is the sole objective of the NHS to maximize health? In the
form of QALYs? Health maximization is definitely a major objective,
however measured. Perhaps this is acceptable as long as it is subject
to review of decisions considered unethical or politically unaccep-
table. And that QALYs reflect peoples’ values in health.
This fixed-budget-health-maximization framework moves
beyond welfare economics to what has been termed ‘‘extra
welfarism’’ [4]. Decisions about what to fund in the NHS becomes
a mathematical programming problem (with a few more assump-
tions: divisibility, constant returns).
This, in turn, has many implications. The perspective is that
of the NHS, the relevant costs are those incurred by the NHS, not
those falling on others such as patients or carers. Because
funding any new technology within a fixed budget means not
funding something else, the QALYs foregone by the latter are the
opportunity cost of the former. The cost per QALY threshold for
decisions on new technologies should be the average incremental
cost per QALY for the entire NHS. And that threshold is directly
linked to the size of the NHS budget.
The implications of this for discounting have only recently
been outlined [2,3]. As one might expect, the discount rates for
costs and health benefits are also linked to the threshold and the
size of the NHS budget. In some dense algebra, Claxton et al. have
shown that unless the threshold is changing, different rates
should apply to costs and QALYs. Furthermore, if the threshold
is rising, the discount rate for costs should be lower than that for
QALYs. And vice versa.
This is a major change in the approach to discounting health
benefits used by NICE, which is set by Her Majesty’s Treasury at
3.5% for both costs and benefits. Consider the implications of the
new approach in relation to the recent history of the threshold. The
threshold has not been adjusted since it ‘‘emerged’’ in NICE
guidance and thus has fallen in real terms. So, the discount rate
for costs should have been higher than for QALYs over that period.
Which it was until 2004 (6% and 1.5%) when it was changed. That
now seems a mistake. Furthermore, if the threshold fell in a period
when the NHS budget expanded 50% in real terms, it can hardly be
expected to rise in the more austere future.
What about Her Majesty’s Treasury? Having in the past
countenanced different discount rates for costs and nonmone-
tary benefits [5], it has advocated a single rate for both since 2003.
Its rationale for the 3.5% rate has it composed of 1% catastrophe
risk, 0.5% pure time preference, and 2% to do with future growth
in consumption. These have been critiqued by Oliver [6]. Echoing
Stern [7], Oliver points out that a 1% catastrophe risk per annum
implies a 60% risk that the world will suffer catastrophe withinationships to disclose.
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consumption seems highly optimistic given economic prospects
and should be set to 0. He suggests that the health discount rate
should be at most 0.5%. In a separate scathing critique, Paulden
has shown that the empirical evidence for the 3.5% estimate is
‘‘remarkably poor’’ and that the works cited by the Treasury do
not support its claims. Worryingly he suggests that the use of a
less exaggerated rate would have led to different decisions not
only by NICE but also in the many projects funded by the Private
Finance Initiative. Finally, because the discount rate for costs
should reflect the cost to the government of borrowing, which
have been close to (or below) 0 for most of the last decade, a 3.5%
discount rate for costs is too high.
While the issue of discount rate in health can seem esoteric,
the issue has been central to the economics of climate change.
The Stern review (for HMT!) not only used different discount
rates for costs and benefits but also argued for a low 1.5% rate for
benefits on the grounds that climate change represented the
greatest market failure in history. This sparked enormous con-
troversy (and literature), with most US economists arguing
against the lower rate. ‘‘Climate change and discounting the
future: a guide for the perplexed’’ suggests that two camps are
shouting across each other: the positivists and the ethicists. The
positivists insist, rightly according to the authors, that public
investment decisions should be made on ground of efficiency by
using cost-benefit analysis, with discount rates for all monetary
values reflecting market rates. They also agree, however, with the
ethicists that cost-benefit analysis should only be one of several
inputs to decisions and should be overridden by ethical concerns.
The key ethical concern with climate change, they argue, has to
do with the legacy to future generations, and should be dealt with
directly rather than by changing the discount rate.
What does this all imply for value-based pricing, which is due
to apply to all new drugs from January 2014? The framework
proposed for this new approach moves from ‘‘extra welfarism’’
back toward welfare economics [8]. A societal perspective is being
advocated for costs, with QALYs weighted to reflect society’s
priorities for factors such as severity and end of life. While
progress has been made on operationalizing a wider social
definition of costs, the weighting of QALYs has proved more
difficult due to lack of inconsistent research findings.
Helpfully the implications for discounting within a societal
perspective such as with value-based pricing have been consid-
ered, with similar results to those presented above. Differentrates are likely for costs and benefits, depending on the rate of
growth of the threshold. (The only difference has to do with the
specification of the social rate of preference for health.)
Coming back to NICE’s decision to reduce the QALY discount
rate to OK mifamurtide, this does seem a mistake for the reasons
the authors give. The Citizen’s Council’s role, while admirable in
general, may have been right in supporting the NHS provision of
a mifamurtide-type drug but wrong in relation to discount rates.
Adjusting QALY directly by means of weights society values, as
suggested by O’Mahoney, would have been better. But as those
struggling to implement value-based pricing know, that is also
proving difficult.
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